This paper makes two contributions to the carbon-sequestration literature. The first is the development of a theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit trading may be analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. The second is a numerical analysis of the model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero.
Introd uction
The main focus of carbon sequestration research has thus far been the empirical estimation of supply functions, both for specific countries and globally. I Although the I supply estimates themselves vary, the general opinion emerging from this literature is that scope exists for cost-effective policies fostering both the curtailment of deforestation and promotion of reforestation in support of carbon sequestration at national, regional, and international levels. What has not yet been considered in this analysis, however, is the role that market structure, or market power, might play in the determination of an equilibrium sequestration allocation and associated carbon price. This paper is a first attempt at chara~terizing the role of market structure in the context of a carbon sequestration model that also incorporates permit trading, and is thus in keeping with multi-instrument approaches promulgated in international agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol (UNFCCC, 1998).
A similar issue was faced roughly 20 years ago with respect to permit trading, when Hahn's (1984) seminal article demonstrated the importance of market power in determining an equilibrium outcome. Hahn's principle result was that if a single firm with market power purchases( sells) permits in an otherwise competitive market it will behave as a monopsonist(monopolist). Thus, the degree of market inefficiency is systematically related to the initial distribution of the permits. Since then, research has attempted to quantify the extent to which monopoly and monopsony power influence the I With respect to country-specific studies, see Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006) for the US, Xu (1995) for China, Fearnside (1995) for Brazil, Ravindranath and Somashekhar (1995) for India, de long, et al. (2000) for Mexico, and Sedjo (1999) for Argentina. See Benitez, et al. (2007) and Sohngen and Sedjo (2004) for estimates of global supply. 2 permit-trading equilibrium, most notably in the field of experimental economics using auction-type environments. 2 Contrary to these earlier works, which assume the existence of monopoly and monopsony power, we develop a competitive fringe model that reflects the most likely structure that will emerge in a global market (or series of regional markets) for carbon sequestration in the presence of permit trading. Our presumption that a competitive fringe will emerge in the sequestration market is premised on two strands of the sequestration literature. The first strand is empirical, the second theoretical.
With respect to the empirical literature, Benitez, et al. (2007) estimate global sequestration supply curves for afforestation and reforestation activities based on highly disaggregated (grid-level) physical data with country-level controls for political, financial, and economic risks. They find that low-cost sequestration sites are mainly located in regions of the developing world, such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern Brazil, and Southeast Asia.
3 This suggests inter alia that national-level findings, most notably those ofStavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006) , must be tempered by the fact that domestic sequestration policies are likely to co-exist, be supplemented by, or be preempted by international or regional agreements to combat climate change. As a result of comparative advantages, such as those identified by Benitez, et al. (2007) , the equilibrium that emerges in a regional or global sequestration may be governed more by the interplay of a dominant firm (or nation or region) and a competitive fringe than by perfect competition within a given nation.
It is of course possible that on a global scale the market for sequestration could resemble more an oligopoly than a competitive fringe. However, as Asheim, et al. (2006) point out, there are fairly general conditions under which multiple regional agreements I (that internalize global externalities such as climate change) outperform a single global agreement. In particular, the authors find that a regime with two agreements can Pareto dominate a regime based on a single global treaty, implying that regional cooperation might be a good alternative -or supplement -to a global environmental agreement. In a world governed by such regional agreements oligopolies are less likely to form.
Consider, for example, a regional agreement between the US and Brazil. Brazil, for its part, could p~tentially act as a dominant firm due to its relatively low marginal costs of sequestration (associated with existing reforestation opportunities on vast tracts of public land (Benitez, et aI., 2007) ). US farmers would in turn act as a competitive fringe due to their relatively high marginal costs of sequestration (associated with existing opportunity costs for alternative private land uses (Lubowski, et aI., 2006) ). International trading in sequestered carbon would complement an existing domestic permit-trading market in the US that includes the nation's largest industrial polluters.
In this paper, we develop a simple theoretical framework of a competitive sequestration fringe in conjunction with a permit trading market (for abatement by polluters). We then demonstrate through numerical analysis the responsiveness of equilibrium sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative cost structures of the three agents included in the model -a dominant sequestration firm, competitive fringe firms, and polluters·who participate in a permit trading market. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of sequestration and abatement align wi!h a higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero. However, the (implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually reaching zero itself.
We begin our analysis in Section 2 with a simple graphical exposition of the competitive fringe model in the presence of permit trading. Section 3 provides a more rigorous mathematical framework and presents a simple numerical model, which is then solved for an ini,tial set of parameter values and for subsequent changes in the relative cost structures embodied by these parameters. The results of the numerical analysis are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
A Simple Graphical Analysis
This section presents a simple graphical analysis of sequestration and permit trading in the context of a competitive fringe model. As a point of departure, consider the standard textbook model of the competitive fringe depicted in Figure 1 . Incorporating permit trading into this model (for ease of exposition only two polluters cum traders are needed) adds corresponding kinks to the dominant firm's residual demand curve. The model is depicted in Figure 2 .
[
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In Figure 2 , the Dr curve has kinks at prices pf(the vertical intercept of the competitive fringe's aggregate supply curve S) and PI (the vertical intercept of polluter pi's permit supply curve ~l). Here, the dominant firm maximizes profit at point e by setting a price of p * and selling q; units of sequestered carbon. The competitive fringe therefore produces q; of sequestration at point d and polluter p 1 offers q;l abatement credits for sale at point/(via abatement beyond its statutorily required amount). Because the equilibrium price p * lies beneath the vertical intercept of its permit supply curve, polluter p2 chooses not to supply a positive amount of abatement credits to the market.
5
Market equilibrium occurs at point g, with price p * and total quantity sequestered Figure 2 brings to light a complication in the sequestration/permit trading model that is absent from the basic model depicted in Figure 1 . In Figure 1 , closure (via equating market demand and supply) is not really an issue. This is because the demand and supply 5 Note that the vertical intercept of Dr occurs at price Pb which in tum is the vertical intercept of polluter p2's permit supply curve ::/2. The coincidence of these two vertical intercepts is consistent with the fact that for carbon prices above P2 polluter p2 also becomes a net supplier of abatement credits. With both polluters pi and p2 now being net suppliers, market demand for sequestration is effectively negative, i.e., for prices above P2 the U curve extends into the second quadrant of the Cartesian coordinate system. 6 sides of the market are separate, i.e., those demanding the good are not also supplying it, and vice versa. This is not the case in the sequestration/permit trading model.
Recall from Figure 2 that polluter pi is a net supplier of abatement credits, and b~th the competitive fringe and dominant firm are also suppliers of credits (in the form of sequestration). Because it is explicitly included in the model, polluter p2 must therefore consume the total amount of credits produced for sale, Q*. This explains the positioning of polluter p2's permit supply curve. The equilibrium price p* is consistent with polluter p2 effectively supplying a negative amount of abatement credits for sale (i.e., demanding a positive number of credits). In specific, polluter p2's demand for credits must equal the total amount of ~redits offered for sale by the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and polluter pi, i.e., Q*.
To provide a more rigorous assessment of the competitive fringe/permit trading model, in particular with respect to its comparative static properties, we now turn to theoretical and numerical analyses based on a full accounting of the model's components.
In particular, we explicitly close the model with a market-clearing condition that is premised on statutorily required abatement levels for each polluter.
Theoretical and Numerical Models
As indicated in Section 2, the competitive fringe model of carbon sequestration and permit trading has three different types of agents/industries: (i) a dominant firm, (ii) a permit-trading market comprised of polluting firms, and (iii) a competitive fringe. We begin this section with a general analytical treatment of sequestration and permit trading, which then guides the development of a simple numerical model to assess the 7 responsiveness of sequestration and abatement to changes in the relative cost structures of the three agents/industries.
To begin, the dominant firm chooses its quantity of carbon sequestration, qd, to s~lve the profit-maximization problem,
where p is the per-unit price of sequestered carbon (also, in equilibrium, the price of a carbon permit), q; is the vector (q;1 , .... , q;1 ) of (profit-maximized) net supplies of abatement credits produced by the i = 1, .... ,1 polluting firms participating in the permit > market (q;i -fJ for all i), q~ = I . q~ is the total (profit-maximized) supply of
< )
sequestered carbon produced by the} = 1, .... ,J competitive fringe firms ( q ~ 2 0 for all}),
Cd is the dominant firm's sequestration (total) cost function (C~ > 0, c; > 0), and Fd is a one-time licensing fee verifying the transferability of the dominant firm's sequestered carbon.
7 Further, P q ,p . ,and P • are each assumed negative. The Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition for this problem is, which results in the dominant firm ' s implicit supply of carbon sequestration,
and, for future reference, partially determines the equilibrium price of sequestered carbon,p*.
In the permit trading market, polluter i chooses its quantity of abatement, q ., to solve 
9 The curvature conditions on Cpi ensure that the polluting firm's problem is concave. Note that this problem can equivalently be expressed in terms ofthe polluting firm's choice of emissions rather than abatement level. We have chosen the latter merely for expositional and numerical modeling convenience. Also for convenience, we assume that verifying the transferability ofthe polluters' abatement is costless. 
In long-run equilibrium the zero-profit condition for fringe firms}, Jl"~ = 0, detennines the number of firms in the fringe, F1, .... ,F J ) is the vector of fringe firms ' licensing fees.
Finally, a market clearing condition closes the model, Qp ~ q~ +q; +Q; = Q*.
Equation (5) Both the competitive fringe and polluter pl are high-cost relative to the dominant firm .
These relative costs reflect the underlying maintained assumptions of the competitive fringe model, in particular that the dominant firm generally faces lower sequestration costs than the competitive fringe and the polluters, and the competitive fringe in turn faces lower cost than at least some of the polluters. 13 [INSERT We begin by noting that at these initial parameter values the competitive fringe produces slightly less sequestration in aggregate than the dominant firm,
i.e., q; = 3.441> q; = 3.014. At the equilibrium price p* = 6.039, polluter pJ supplies a positive amount of abatement credits (q;l = 2.048), while polluterp2 demands the sum of these credits and the sequestration produced by the dominant firm and competitive fringe, i.e., Qp2 -ii p 2 = Q* = 8.503:::::> q;2 = -8.503.
As expected, in relation to the competitive benchmark equilibrium the competitive fringe's supply of sequestration, as well as both polluters' abatement efforts, all decrease in response to the presence of a dominant firm. The equilibrium carbon price also decreases, due to the combination of the dominant firm's lower costs of sequestration and the restriction of the market demand curve (see Figure 2) . The decrease in the 14 The conception of perfect competition in the competitive fringe model is markedly different than in a monopoly model. In a monopoly model, the monopolist's marginal cost curve corresponds to (or is subsumed by) the industry's marginal cost under perfect competition. As a result of this difference, the equilibrium carbon price in the competitive fringe model can be higher than in the perfect competition model. [
INSERT FIGURES 3 AND 4 HERE]
In Figure 3 we see that these changes result in both the competitive fringe and lowcost polluter pi losing market share to the dominant firm. The competitive fringe loses market share at an increasing rate up to the sixth step increase in its marginal cost, at which point its sequestration supply begins an asymptotic decent toward zero. Polluter pi loses market share at a decreasing rate throughout and becomes a net buyer of sequestration at the fourth step increase in its marginal abatement cost. These two trends position the dominant firm as the sole supplier of sequestration (to both polluters) by the 10th step increase.
Concomitant with these changes in relative market shares, Figure 4 shows that the dominant firm's profit increases exponentially with the step increases. The carbon price rises along with the dominant firm's market share and profit (and the gradual disappearance of the competitive fringe). Interestingly, the (implied) number of fringe firms rises gradually over the first 5 step increases (approximately the same number of steps during which the fringe's (aggregate) market share declines at an increasing rate).
The number of firms then falls for the next two periods, rises again for the following period, and then falls steeply toward zero by the final step. At that point the fringe has completely disappeared.
Summary and Discussion
This paper makes two contribution' s to the carbon-sequestration literature; a literature which has heretofore been focused on the empirical estimation of sequestration supply functions, both for specific countries and globally. The first contribution is to develop a theoretical framework within which sequestration and permit trading may be analyzed jointly in the context of a competitive fringe model. An empirically based motivation for developing this framework is provided by Benitez, et al. (2007) , who find that low-cost sequestration sites are mainly located in regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, southeastern Brazil, and Southeast Asia. This suggests that the equilibrium emerging in a regional or global sequestration market may be governed more by the interplay of a dominant firm (e.g., public land owned by a specific region or nation) and a competitive fringe (e.g., private land owned by u.S. farmers) than by perfect competition within a given nation (as assumed by Stavins (1999) and Lubowski, et al. (2006) ).
The second contribution is to numerically analyze the competitive fringe/permittrading model. We find that when the cost-structure changes lead to progressively less separation in costs between the competitive fringe and the polluters (as well as between the polluters themselves), and the dominant firm becomes progressively more low-cost relative to the competitive fringe and the polluters, the equilibrium allocations of sequestration and abatement align with a higher carbon price. Aggregate output from the competitive fringe decreases smoothly and asymptotically toward zero. However, th~ (implied) number of fringe firms fluctuates up and down, eventually reaching zero itself.
These results demonstrate the responsiveness of sequestration and abatement allocations to changes in the relative cost structures of the dominant firm, the competitive fringe, and the polluters engaged in permit trading.
Of course numerical analysis based on ad hoc parameter values and functional forms is limited by its inability to inform policy with anything other than a more qualitative assessment of-equilibrium allocations in a relative sense, e.g., by answering questions such as how 'smooth' might be the disappearance of a competitive fringe as the dominant firm becomes more cost-effective in its production of sequestration, or vice-versa? Until the parameter values and functional forms themselves are empirically estimated and incorporated into the numerical analysis, the numerical model will be limited in its policy relevance.
However, this type of criticism also runs in the opposite direction. Until empirical analyses such as Stavins (1999 ), Lubowski, et al. (2006 , and Benitez, et al. (2007) account for both the global nature of the carbon sequestration problem and the corresponding market structures that are most likely to govern the behavior of the various agents involved, estimates of what are inherently endogenous variables (e.g., the allocation of sequestration and abatement and the carbon price) will be biased estimates of the equilibrium outcomes themselves. Thus, the avenue for future research seems clear.
Demand-side information must be incorporated into supply-side models; information that is global in scale (or regional if carbon emissions are to be controlled via a set of region-based agreements a la Asheim, et aI., 2006) and reflective of underlying mark~t structure. Incorporation of this type of information into national supply-side models, such as those of Lubow ski, et al. (2006) and Stavins (1999) , will extend supply estimates from reflecting what is possible under the parochial assumptions of perfect competition to what is a likely in the wider realm of a global equilibrium. The same can be said for global supply-side models, such as Benitez, et al.'s (2007) . With respect to the role that market structure might play in the allocation of sequestration and abatement on a global or regional scale; echoes can be heard of Hahn's (1984) seminal article demonstrating the importance of market power in detennining an equilibrium outcome. -------
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